This is the blog for the PH214/314/514 History of Philosophy: Contemporary Unit. Please feel free to post questions, comments and announcements. Please respect normal courtesies in discussion.
Ok, folks, yesterday we had a really interesting discussion about the question: Crisis of the European Sciences is clearly a difficult book. Where is the difficulty?
One could say that the difficulty lies within the wording of the book, and that if written in a more concise manner, it may be easier to make head-and-tail of the arguments.
But, even if it were written as a well stylised prose of J.S.Mill, I still think that it would pose itself as a difficult concept. Why? Simply because it arouses the thoughts of suspension; a concept that we, as the human collective, find hard to come to terms with.
When one has been shown to look at the bare necessities of existence (experience, itself), one is faced with the option to justify one's beliefs, or instead, to work from liquid ground. What follows, is a re-forming of the self. From initial suspension, and later, to justification, is where we are led, when we are taken back to our initial foundation; that of experience.
This, is the greatest difficultly, and is the first 'hump', I believe, of understanding where Husserl is coming from.
Yes, I think you're right. The difficulty of Husserl's style is partly a result of the difficulty of the subject matter that he is trying to work through.
I see that we all in agreement. Philosophy solved.
Actually, there is one thing that I'd like to mention.
When we speak of things as being self-evident, it seems that what we are saying, is that from any angle that we look at something, our experience of the concept, or the thing, cannot be denied. For example, it is absurd to say "I am not thinking", as no matter how I look at it, I cannot contemplate thought, without thinking; them being one and the same thing.
My question is, are we able to base our self-knowledge, purely on tautological contemplations? By this I mean the initial foundations of our experience being grounded in the fact that we cannot deny them, thus, equalling a non-conflicting set of what can be said as 'self-knowledge'. Or, more precisely to say, what the self consists of; it being all that is, and thus, knowledge.
To further illustrate. My definition of a cat, cannot be the same as that of a dog, that is, unless each word were to represent the same conceptual definition. If the definiton were to remain the same, then, when it is used in a thought equation (the processes that we use to reflect upon our thoughts), along with other conceptual definitions, the conclusion will be tautological; that is to say, it follows from the conceptual definitions that are currently in view; not as the only outcome, but purely as one that is viewed as being true, solely because it is not in conflict with the base definitions.
Is the issue whether or not you can get knowledge beyond a logical tautology? Like Descartes having trouble proceeding from the cogito argument.
Is the cat/dog example a different kind of situation? As the the comparison is between a inherently questionable category (species). We could imagine a situation where we would reorganise species classification and those definitions would be altered. (I don't know how....but it seems possible)
Where as the a tautology like "I am thinking" is undeniable in a different kind of way. It's not conceptually based like knowing what a cat and dog is. If someone is a thinking being then they can't escape this fact and it is impossible to reorganise or re-conceptualise thinking.
I can see where it is that I have left out a premise.
When I speak of definitional process' as having the possibility of being tautological, I am basing it upon the grounds that one cannot deny that the thoughts that are in ones head exist, with respect to the mind. (Thoughts being the things, within the mind, that, for one, one is aware of, two, are representations, and recognisations, of mental processes, and three, that they are able to be explored).*
Thinking, referring to the example I used before, is a process that, by its nature, requires something to be thought about. It is a process, and therefore, requires values to work with. These values, underlie our thinking process. However, I do not think that the process of thinking, necessarily, requires thoughts** (again, mental things that: one is aware of; can be explored; and are, recognisations, and representations). What it does require, are values; something for the process to work with.
These values, are what underlie our thinking processes, they are what the thinking process works with. What distinguishes our values from our definitions, are, that one exists as something that one is not immediately aware of (the value), while the other is something that one is aware of, and can work with (the definition. Similar to a thought, but used to denote the parts that make up a thought).***
*This said, I am still quite unsure of how to define a thought. For example, 'Can a basic concept, such as existence, be a thought? Or is the ability to be broken down into further definitions, a pre-requisite of a thought? The words 'to exist', 'to be', and 'is', seem to me, as being things that can only be explained in terms of themselves. They are incapable of being broken down any further. So, possibly a pre-requisite to a thought, is the ability to be broken down.
**To illustrate my point about thinking without thoughts, let me give this example. Have you sat there and stared out, into space; not aware of what it is exactly that is going on inside your mind, but aware that something is happening? This, is what I am referring to. It's thinking (a mental process with underlying values), but without the ability to recognise what it is that is being thought about. It is thinking, without thought. So, think of it this way, there are two type of thinking; one with thoughts, the other with solely unseen values.
*** Upon reflecting on this paragraph, I would like to note that the underlying values, as I referred to them, may, in fact, be a single underlying entity, the single mental 'I' that comes before our thinking (both aware, and non-aware); and that when it is brought into awareness, it is expressed as a multitude of definitions
So, finally, in response to your questions; now that we have gotten the ground-work out of the way.
What I am saying, is that we (or at least me, as I can only speak for myself) are bound by our definitions.
For example:
A = B B = C Therefore, A = C
This, is a tautological argument. If A is defined the same as B, and B is defined the same as C, then A is defined the same as C. These alphabetical symbols represent the same thing. A = C, because A is C; they are only seperated by different symbols. This is something I'm sure that most people would agree with me on. However, what is often overlooked, is how important this argument is. There is no other way to view this argument, nor its conclusion, that is, unless the symbols were defined differently. If they are valued the same, then, in this argument, only one answer can follow. One is bound by the definitions that one assigns to symbols.
Now, what I am suggesting, is that part of our thinking processes, are, in essence, syllogisms. When we think, and reflect upon our thoughts, we can make sense of, and analyse, certain situations, and ideas. The reason why we can do this, is because our aware thought, has the potential of working in a syllogistic format. Values are defined, and brought to our awareness, they are then seen to, either, cohere, or not cohere. This, if you will allow me to say so, is the Logic of the mind. A capability of the mind, but not something that is always followed; at least, not in the strictest sense. Sometimes, the meanings of certain definitions, are not analysed correctly, and are, instead, used inconsistently; though, blindly seen as coherent.
When I am speaking of tautological knowledge, what I mean, is, knowledge that is grounded in definitional tautologies. It is a coherent expression of a person's entire definitional framework. As all the definitions logically follow, they are therefore tautologies; from no perspective of the self, can they be viewed as false.
So, when I am speaking of knowledge, I am not referring to an objective knowledge, I am merely referring to knowledge of the self****
In response, then, the issue is, I suppose, whether or not knowledge can go beyond a logical tautology. However, I would still say, that within the definition of knowledge, is the supposition that it cannot be viewed from anything else but the self.
As you can see, when I referring to the dog and cat situation, I was not referring to an objective species defintion, but to the definition that a person has of a dog (which could be that of a scientific defining of cat, and dog, as species; but, without the supposition it is objective knowledge).
...and they all note down "Never ask James for a simple answer, again".
**** What is, is what is. Knowledge is the state of knowing what is. One can have knowledge of oneself, if one's definitions are tautologically coherent. The reason why I say this, is because knowledge seems to always be in reference to a sense of awareness, and to that which is, as being that which is. If there is no aware being to judge, then there is no knowledge.
I am afraid I have had trouble following your line of argument, but as I have missed class today I feel motivated to try and assist you- even if it is to stand as a indication of what your not concerned with.
To me, at least, it seems as if you are asking wether or not knowledge- which you have defined as intentional cognitive content of a human mind- can exist as anything other than an objective statement about the phenomenal world. This issue is one that looks to be approached by the method of phenomenology, however, it is done so under the understanding that the pre-scientific world- ie the life world- has a precedence over the scientific-world. I think how Husserl would answer your question, and please someone correct me if I am off-base, is to state that your logical inferences of a=b,b=c,a=c rests upon the presupposition of a, b and c already having actual existence. This is to say, that by focusing first upon the objectivity of a,b and c you have already, in a way, isolated a,b and c from the pre-given world.
How this relates to knowledge going beyond a logical tautology is, i think, to be found in how it relates to the pre-given world- this is, i think the phenomenological argument. As an example:
Winnie the Pooh (a) is a fictional bear who belongs to Christopher Robin and wears a red shirt (b), is a tautology in that a=b. However, the question I think you might be asking is, "do we want to say that this is actual knowledge"? I think this is where I may have to step back and let others take the line of argument as my knowledge on truth theories is minimal at best. However, before I sign off I would like to add one more thing, namely, that I think the phenomenologist would state that the occurrence of this question is raised by the initial assumption that "a" has an already agreed upon objective value content rather than trying to appraise its subjective-relative nature as it exists in the pre-given or life-world.
I hope this is helpful or at least sparks discussion...how was class???
First of all, the question that I asked, five comments ago, was in need of justification, and explaination, before it could be understood as to where I am coming from, and why I would propose such a thing.
It was not asking the question "can knowledge exist as anything other than an objective statement about the phenomenal world?", but was, instead, "are we able to base our self-knowledge, purely on tautological contemplations?". This question that I posed, was full of unexplained premises, and was badly worded.
How it should have been worded, was something like "Is what I can truly call knowledge, something that is comprised purely of tautological definitions?"
The reasons why I am asking this question, is based upon certain premises (these are some of them, but not exclusively).
1) Thinking processes pre-suppose, and require, definitions, in order for them to function.
2) To engage with the thinking processes, one must be aware of these definitions.
3)Knowledge is a comparitive statement (so, a correspondence theory). I know, because my beilef that 'thing A' exists, corresponds to that of an actual existence of 'thing A'.
4A)Knowledge, as defined above, holds true for subjective and objective statements e.g. knowledge of the self is said to be knowledge, purely because it is corresponds to itself. 'I believe that thought A exists. Thought A does exist. Therefore, I have knowledge of thought A's existence')
4B)Subjective knowledge is, therefore, in essence, apodictic.
5)Knowledge is not the entirety of something, but is, rather, an aware mental engagement (thinking) with the thing in itself, in this case, the entirety of the aware mind.
This is not a satisfactory justification, I realise, but I currently do not have the time to expound on it. However, I would be happy to explain it, at another time.
There is one more thing that I would like to add, however.
In reference to my A=B=C syllogism, I would not say that any of these symbols represent objective values. They are values that are ground there existence in the mind. Yes, I agree that they must have a grounding for their existence, but it does not necessarily follow that they must be, nor are they, grounded within the objective. You seem to be necessitating that our life-world must come from the objective world; this, is something that I am not necessitating.
And also, class was gresat. You, unfortunately, missed a very invigorating speech by Xavier and Killian.
Great discussion guys. Keep it up. I'm not going to intervene at this stage but will come in at the end when the discussion has wound down. And yes all three presentations so far have been really excellent.
I'm still in the dark a little on what is being asked, but perhaps if we approach these premises one by one and see how they relate to your question things might become a little more clear for me.
Beginning with the first premise: "Thinking processes pre-suppose, and require, definitions, in order for them to function." I am not sure I wholly agree with this, as it appears that a previous assumption has been made. This is to say that, this premise is built upon the assumption that unless a linguistic or symbolic structure is already present in a mental process it can not be considered as thinking. What then is thinking, and more troubling, how do we come about acquiring the ability to think. I will try and explain a little better in an example.
Take for example an infant who is up until this point in time unable to talk- by talk I mean in a symbolic or linguistic manner. So then, up until this point every bodily function that the baby has performed, eating, crawling smiling etc., has been done so without the capability of categorising objects and sensations into a system of symbols with coherent expressible definitions. We can say, however, that the infant is capable of full range of motion and interaction with the objects in the phenomenal world. This would seem, at least to me, to indicate that it has a functioning thought process concerning its appendages in regards the surrounding objects. However, when the infant gets a little older and begins to express itself in a socially coherent linguistic manner, nothing seems to have really changed about the movements themselves. By this I mean that to put something in its mouth and chew is the same action regardless of whether or not the infant now proclaims, "I'm going to put this in my mouth and chew it".
Ok, so how does this relate to your first premise? Well, I would assert that there is a thought process occurring in both (a) the infant who can create symbolic and linguistic definitions and (b) the infant who can not create these definitions.The first premise of your assertion would seem to deny that infant (b) is capable of a thought process. The question now becomes, how does the infant come into acquiring possession of such symbols and linguistic definitions. Surely it can not be through a inherent set (This seems to adhere to a doctrine of the Platonic Forms), and conversely, surely it couldn't have learn't them because that would seem to require a thought process.
This is where, as far as I can tell, we seem to be disagreeing on your a,b,c syllogism. When I said that a,b,c had objective values I was not referring to the letters in themselves. Rather, your use of a,b,c in a demonstrative example that pertains to the phenomenal world ITSELF, implies that you have presupposed the objective value contained represented within a,b,c. So, I think Husserl is trying to point this out when he indicates that Positivism as an extension of objective science ignores the life-world as its basis for a presupposed Ontic grounding. Much in the same way that the first assertion seems to ignore the stage in the infants life where it was incapable of creating and articulating symbolic and linguistic definitions.
Again, I hope this is moving in the direction of question. If so and we can come to some agreement perhaps we can move to the second premise.
You are quite right, Damian, in regards to the first premise. I was wrong in stating the 1st premise as it was written. I am not surprised that I wrote it, however, as I was having a lot trouble trying to lay out a clear format for the argument.
I agree with you. I do not believe that all thinking processes pre-suppose linguistics. I tried to distinguish between thinking with the awareness of what is being thought, and thinking without without expression (so, you could see one as being expressed in, and formulated into, language; while the other being thought without language, and with the inability to express what is being thought [as, I believe, you would, again, return to the realm of language]). Have a look at the comment 'J. Paul. TaylerMar 20, 2012 09:04 AM', if you need any help in understanding what I mean (Hopefully I actually spoke with a little more clarity, this time). It will be at the bottom of the comment, under dot-point **.
I also agree that it makes sense to say that an infant cannot learn without the ability to learn, already being, in-built in them; otherwise, how else could the infant come to aquire anything (even Plato's forms would require the infant/person to have the ability to discover/recognise the forms)? I do not claim to know how the cild does this.* What I think that I can be certain of, however, is that the ability to learn must be in-built into the child.
What I'm not sure of, is whether or not these thoughts that are without aware expression (the ones that are not expressed in language), exist before the aquisition (or maybe realisation) of language. Maybe, the inexpressible thought processes, are formed alongside linguistic thought. Are there any thoughts?
* Possibly, the child learns to associate utterances of certain sounds, images, written symbols, with a multitude of objects; and, from this array of general symbols representing a narrow scope of things [linguistic, or ontic], the child tries to make sense of his experiences of the formation, and the arrangements, of general symbols, when they are taken as a whole [the entire array of linguistic usage that he is exposed to]. He may then assign general symbols to the inexpressible thoughts, and see how well general symbols, in the bigger picture, cohere with one another. But, as I said, I don't claim to know.
Maybe it is even through association of objects. Like Adam's example of the hunter. He has a spear, and he kills a rabbit with it. This processes is an everyday occurence, and fulfils his need for food. He begins to associate the rabbit with food, and his spear with the ability to gain food. They become simple symbols to work with, and he may then use the spear to represent 'ability to gain food', and use it in a situation that we would deem odd, but is perfectly logical for him e.g. using his spear to gain berries.
Finally, in response to the 'a, b, c', syllogism, I did not think that you were stating that the letters were objective in themselves. I interpretted what you were possibly saying, in two ways. I read you as saying "the values that you assigned the symbols 'a', 'b', and 'c', were (either) values that assume the objective; (or) values that exist in the objective world". Again, I hope that I am a little bit clearer in explaining what I meant, this time round.
Do you remember our conversation today; how I said that language is a representation of experience? (I used better words, during that conversation; but I think that you understood what I meant. I think that I used the word 'epoche', although, I'm not sure if that was the right word) Well, this is exactly the way in which I was using the symbols 'a', 'b', and 'c'. I am not saying that this initial experience (this 'I', if you will) that is being represented, is drawn from any objective world, but merely that it exists, and is the initial grounding for all of one's workings. I was using the 'a' 'b' 'c' symbols as representations of the general concept of a thought; grounded within the mind, and, potentially, grounded within a relation to ontic, or perceived as ontic, meaning (although, this objective supposition, I do not believe is necessary. I see no reason why we must suppose an objective, in order to ground our being in experience-in-itself. This, Ibelieve, can exist separately)
Well, there certainly is a lot in those two posts worth discussing. However, rather than jumping straight into the deep end, lets do as we agreed to do earlier this afternoon. That is, lets start our philosophising from the position of the epoche illustrated and worked through by Husserl. Then from here we can both work our way forward and perhaps with some luck get closer to your question.
So first let us begin with your question: "Is what I can truly call knowledge, something that is comprised purely of tautological definitions?" Post 21 March.
To begin with if you will agree lets use Husserl's words, "Universal doubt cancels itself. Thus, during the universal epohce, the absolutely apodictic self-evidence "I am"[the ego] is at my disposal."(pp77) Also, "Whatever else enters the stage as apodictic, as for example, mathematical axioms, certainly does leave open possibilities of doubt and thus also the conceivability of their being false."(pp78)This is the point that you stated, quite rightly, I could not deny; I will instead, with your permission, use it as our starting point. From here we have separated the "ego" from all other ontic validities- for it is the only one of which we can be certain to be true. Everything else is, as Hersserl states, "In the epoche, all these determinations, and the world itself, have been transformed into my ideae..." (pp78). Next, let us approach knowledge in the same manner as we discussed today. You began by stating that knowledge was a comparative statement. I believe you have stated an example in one of your posts above so I won't trouble you with another. Furthermore, that before you can make this comparative statement you must have the ability to use the appropriate symbols to express said statement- in this case I believe you gave the example of language written/oral. To which then, knowledge of a cat is not knowledge of the cat in-itself, but indeed knowledge only of what is indicated or denoted by the symbol cat. I hope we are still in agreement as to the representation of how you would like to structure your argument so far.
I know this is only a small start but I am sure we can build upon it if we can discover where we are heading. If this is all ok I look forward to the continuation of the premises.
Is this where the madman falls down and says "They understand me, at last!".
Yes, this is exactly what I am talking about; or, at least, this is the very starting point for what I am talking about.
In regards to Husserl's point about mathematics being apodictic, this is where I would draw the distinction, again, between language, and the epoche. The epoche is apodictic, and cannot be denied because of what it is in itself, while mathematics, you could say the same thing about, however, with one extra addition, it exists within the linguistic realm (what implications this may have, we will discuss, later). For now, continue on. I think that we have established the first premise.
Right then, for our second step forward I should like, with your permission, to follow in Husserl's logical progression from epoche into recognition of the pre-given world (life-world) as our initial grounding. It is because of our grounding in the pre-given world that we begin to raise questions of ontic validity, and so from an intentional reduction arrive at the epoche. To this we need add that, upon reflection, our experiences of the the pre-given world, before analysis- is one of subjectivity. Here Husserl directs us to the different aspects of a perceived object in the life-world, as our reason for asserting their ontic validity.
"But one could and one can realise this only when one finally and quite seriously inquires into that which is taken for granted, which is presupposed by all thinking...by consistently interrogating the ontic validity meaning of these ends and accomplishments." (pp113)
I am sorry for taking the "long way around", but this is where I would like to assert the Husserl's bracketing of everything concerned with ontic validity from the "ego". This all being said, we know have a stable platform with which to view your question on knowledge.
Now we have seen that from our grounding in the pregiven-world we have performed the first intentional reduction which has led us directly to that which has its necessary existence as the consciousness performing the reflection. Further to this we have "bracketed" out any other questions of ontic validity from the "ego" and labelled them as subjective phenomena.The question we must ask ourselves now, and throughout our discussion, is "have we yet arrived at anything we can call knowledge"? We have asserted that "I exist" and in doing so indicated that we have a belief that a thing that is I exists". We have justified this belief by showing its essential necessity. The FACT that I exist, then, must be true. I would like to say that this is a kind of Objective Knowledge, although i can not say what I exist as ontically speaking. If we know turn to the description of knowledge indicated in our earlier premises we can try and see where my previous assertion lies.
This question we are now turning to is this, "Does the assertion "I exist" stand as a mere tautological definition, rather than some other form of knowledge"? There is by no means an easy way for me to answer this, and so I hope you will have patience with my explanation. Firstly, if this were a simple tautological statement it would, by your indicated definition, indicate only that the linguistic symbols "I" and "Exist" are understood. This would imply in the case of "I" an ontically laden value content. Not because the symbol "I" has anything in-itself, but rather because of our use of it. This is to say, in the alphabet the letter "I" is a symbol that pertains to the series of symbols that make up the english alphabet. However, in the use of "I exist" it points to something having an ontic validity. In much the same way we can say that 1 is a symbol that pertains to a series of numbers, but 1 "Something" indicates ontic validity of 1 "something". In addition to this I think Husserl might disagree that self-knowledge- as derived from the epoche- is a simple tautological statement. This is primarily because prior to the epoch, that is the intentional self reflection, we do not understand what the symbol "I" represents. Rather, it is only after the epoche that we can assert the "I" more clearly. Put more concisely- I hope- our understanding of the use of the symbol "I" after the epoche belongs to a continuously developing definition due to our thermatic self reflections.
I will stop here as I feel I have said enough for you to create an objection based upon your definition of knowledge. I have tried to be concise and brief in my explanation and can, and I look forward to your thoughts.
I agree with Damien here, it seems to me that "I exist" cannot be a tautology because that seems to imply set phenomenological definitions about the "I". A fixed definition for "I" cannot be what Husserl meant because, as far as i understand it, the statement on page 178 "Not even the single philosopher by himself, within the epoche, can hold fast to anything in this elusively flowing life, repeat it with always the same content, and become so certain of its this-ness and its being-such that he could describe it, document it, so to speak (even for his own person alone), in definitive statements."
Well, as it has been quiet for some time now, I thought that I might start another discussion thread. However, so as not to lose the momentum of what we have been talking about prior to now I will try my best to inter-relate the subject matter. Before we begin I wanted to thank Paul for a fantastic presentation and the dialogue that arose from it; just brilliant!
To begin I thought we might continue our discussion concerning truth. However, instead of focusing on "how can we know", perhaps we could turn to the question of "why should we try know". By asking this question it is not my intention to appear glib or esoteric. I would like to start our discussions here because it may allow us to see a little clearer, at the very least personally, why it should matter if knowledge is a "mere tautology" or otherwise. I am aware that the asking of this question can carry with it a subversive undercurrent or certain level sophistry, but this is not my intention.
So then to proceed I would like to return to a question I asked during class, namely, "why shouldn't we run away from conflict"? After spending some long hours thinking about this I came to three, tentative, conclusions- I welcome any argumentation on the following.
1)Run: This seems to be concerned with survival and so is a self motivated style of living. As a consequence it would appear that actions of this kind are intentionally focused on the self and intentionally disregard an "other(s)".
2)Fight: This option indicates an intentionality to remove that which obscures an objective, through the use of methods and means by which the objective is not itself lost in the process. This would be a position from which actions are focused on, but not limited to, the self; this indicates scope for concerns of an "other(s)".
3)Capitulation: A recognition of the lack of intention to motivate oneself to either run or fight; a resolution to accept what is given by an "other(s)".
My question is this- if you agree with these three assertions- "what is our intention when asking questions regarding knowledge?" I would suspect that if we can answer this question first then we will be more certain of whether or not we have a "true" direction and intentionality to our observations. More importantly, if we arrive at a certain conclusion and find that we are dissatisfied with it, we will have a better understanding of why this is so.
My question to the posters is, then, "when discussing philosophical concepts why should we not run?"
Hmm, I was just looking at a quote from Husserl that I have written up on my wall. It reads "No-one who is truly receptive to Philosophy is ever frightened off by difficulties".
Philosophy, even by it's most anyalytical members, is something that is ne'er impossible to detach one's emotions from.
Why do we do not run? We do not run because we find ourselves attached to ideals. Theories are like children; you don't merely discard them because a friend calls them 'ugly' or 'misguided'.
Philosophy is not 'the argument for argument's sake'; it argues with a purpose. And with this purpose, the goal is usually more than just mere defending a proposition; something that you may find in the legal studies (It may sound like a witty quip, but, with law, it is your job to defend, with Philosophy, you defend because the ideal, the theory, is worth fighting for; it brings one closer to wisdom).
The telos of Philosophical argument is one that stays true to its name; the love of wisdom.
You stay to fight, because you see a purpose that goes beyond mere argument. It doesn't matter if you are correct in any objective sense; it is something close to your heart.
Make no mistake, I didn't answer your proposition in syllogistic format for a reason. It is not an analytical question, but one that finds its understanding in the experience, and not in mere words.
So, why do we not run? Because we cannot. There was never any real threat.
Thank you for your post James, I liked the literary touch- ne'er. What you have presented is certainly an interesting point of view! As we discussed I put together an observational paper for your inspection and would be glad to hear of how you feel your comments correspond with or reject my observations.
Ok, folks, yesterday we had a really interesting discussion about the question:
ReplyDeleteCrisis of the European Sciences is clearly a difficult book. Where is the difficulty?
Any further comments.
One could say that the difficulty lies within the wording of the book, and that if written in a more concise manner, it may be easier to make head-and-tail of the arguments.
ReplyDeleteBut, even if it were written as a well stylised prose of J.S.Mill, I still think that it would pose itself as a difficult concept. Why? Simply because it arouses the thoughts of suspension; a concept that we, as the human collective, find hard to come to terms with.
When one has been shown to look at the bare necessities of existence (experience, itself), one is faced with the option to justify one's beliefs, or instead, to work from liquid ground. What follows, is a re-forming of the self. From initial suspension, and later, to justification, is where we are led, when we are taken back to our initial foundation; that of experience.
This, is the greatest difficultly, and is the first 'hump', I believe, of understanding where Husserl is coming from.
Yes, I think you're right. The difficulty of Husserl's style is partly a result of the difficulty of the subject matter that he is trying to work through.
ReplyDeleteI see that we all in agreement. Philosophy solved.
ReplyDeleteActually, there is one thing that I'd like to mention.
When we speak of things as being self-evident, it seems that what we are saying, is that from any angle that we look at something, our experience of the concept, or the thing, cannot be denied. For example, it is absurd to say "I am not thinking", as no matter how I look at it, I cannot contemplate thought, without thinking; them being one and the same thing.
My question is, are we able to base our self-knowledge, purely on tautological contemplations? By this I mean the initial foundations of our experience being grounded in the fact that we cannot deny them, thus, equalling a non-conflicting set of what can be said as 'self-knowledge'. Or, more precisely to say, what the self consists of; it being all that is, and thus, knowledge.
To further illustrate. My definition of a cat, cannot be the same as that of a dog, that is, unless each word were to represent the same conceptual definition. If the definiton were to remain the same, then, when it is used in a thought equation (the processes that we use to reflect upon our thoughts), along with other conceptual definitions, the conclusion will be tautological; that is to say, it follows from the conceptual definitions that are currently in view; not as the only outcome, but purely as one that is viewed as being true, solely because it is not in conflict with the base definitions.
Are there any thoughts on this?
Is the issue whether or not you can get knowledge beyond a logical tautology? Like Descartes having trouble proceeding from the cogito argument.
DeleteIs the cat/dog example a different kind of situation? As the the comparison is between a inherently questionable category (species). We could imagine a situation where we would reorganise species classification and those definitions would be altered. (I don't know how....but it seems possible)
Where as the a tautology like "I am thinking" is undeniable in a different kind of way. It's not conceptually based like knowing what a cat and dog is. If someone is a thinking being then they can't escape this fact and it is impossible to reorganise or re-conceptualise thinking.
Not sure if that really responds!!
I can see where it is that I have left out a premise.
ReplyDeleteWhen I speak of definitional process' as having the possibility of being tautological, I am basing it upon the grounds that one cannot deny that the thoughts that are in ones head exist, with respect to the mind. (Thoughts being the things, within the mind, that, for one, one is aware of, two, are representations, and recognisations, of mental processes, and three, that they are able to be explored).*
Thinking, referring to the example I used before, is a process that, by its nature, requires something to be thought about. It is a process, and therefore, requires values to work with. These values, underlie our thinking process. However, I do not think that the process of thinking, necessarily, requires thoughts** (again, mental things that: one is aware of; can be explored; and are, recognisations, and representations). What it does require, are values; something for the process to work with.
These values, are what underlie our thinking processes, they are what the thinking process works with. What distinguishes our values from our definitions, are, that one exists as something that one is not immediately aware of (the value), while the other is something that one is aware of, and can work with (the definition. Similar to a thought, but used to denote the parts that make up a thought).***
*This said, I am still quite unsure of how to define a thought. For example, 'Can a basic concept, such as existence, be a thought? Or is the ability to be broken down into further definitions, a pre-requisite of a thought? The words 'to exist', 'to be', and 'is', seem to me, as being things that can only be explained in terms of themselves. They are incapable of being broken down any further. So, possibly a pre-requisite to a thought, is the ability to be broken down.
**To illustrate my point about thinking without thoughts, let me give this example. Have you sat there and stared out, into space; not aware of what it is exactly that is going on inside your mind, but aware that something is happening? This, is what I am referring to. It's thinking (a mental process with underlying values), but without the ability to recognise what it is that is being thought about. It is thinking, without thought. So, think of it this way, there are two type of thinking; one with thoughts, the other with solely unseen values.
*** Upon reflecting on this paragraph, I would like to note that the underlying values, as I referred to them, may, in fact, be a single underlying entity, the single mental 'I' that comes before our thinking (both aware, and non-aware); and that when it is brought into awareness, it is expressed as a multitude of definitions
So, finally, in response to your questions; now that we have gotten the ground-work out of the way.
ReplyDeleteWhat I am saying, is that we (or at least me, as I can only speak for myself) are bound by our definitions.
For example:
A = B
B = C
Therefore,
A = C
This, is a tautological argument. If A is defined the same as B, and B is defined the same as C, then A is defined the same as C. These alphabetical symbols represent the same thing. A = C, because A is C; they are only seperated by different symbols. This is something I'm sure that most people would agree with me on. However, what is often overlooked, is how important this argument is. There is no other way to view this argument, nor its conclusion, that is, unless the symbols were defined differently. If they are valued the same, then, in this argument, only one answer can follow. One is bound by the definitions that one assigns to symbols.
Now, what I am suggesting, is that part of our thinking processes, are, in essence, syllogisms. When we think, and reflect upon our thoughts, we can make sense of, and analyse, certain situations, and ideas. The reason why we can do this, is because our aware thought, has the potential of working in a syllogistic format. Values are defined, and brought to our awareness, they are then seen to, either, cohere, or not cohere. This, if you will allow me to say so, is the Logic of the mind. A capability of the mind, but not something that is always followed; at least, not in the strictest sense. Sometimes, the meanings of certain definitions, are not analysed correctly, and are, instead, used inconsistently; though, blindly seen as coherent.
When I am speaking of tautological knowledge, what I mean, is, knowledge that is grounded in definitional tautologies. It is a coherent expression of a person's entire definitional framework. As all the definitions logically follow, they are therefore tautologies; from no perspective of the self, can they be viewed as false.
So, when I am speaking of knowledge, I am not referring to an objective knowledge, I am merely referring to knowledge of the self****
In response, then, the issue is, I suppose, whether or not knowledge can go beyond a logical tautology. However, I would still say, that within the definition of knowledge, is the supposition that it cannot be viewed from anything else but the self.
As you can see, when I referring to the dog and cat situation, I was not referring to an objective species defintion, but to the definition that a person has of a dog (which could be that of a scientific defining of cat, and dog, as species; but, without the supposition it is objective knowledge).
...and they all note down "Never ask James for a simple answer, again".
**** What is, is what is. Knowledge is the state of knowing what is. One can have knowledge of oneself, if one's definitions are tautologically coherent. The reason why I say this, is because knowledge seems to always be in reference to a sense of awareness, and to that which is, as being that which is. If there is no aware being to judge, then there is no knowledge.
James,
ReplyDeleteI am afraid I have had trouble following your line of argument, but as I have missed class today I feel motivated to try and assist you- even if it is to stand as a indication of what your not concerned with.
To me, at least, it seems as if you are asking wether or not knowledge- which you have defined as intentional cognitive content of a human mind- can exist as anything other than an objective statement about the phenomenal world. This issue is one that looks to be approached by the method of phenomenology, however, it is done so under the understanding that the pre-scientific world- ie the life world- has a precedence over the scientific-world. I think how Husserl would answer your question, and please someone correct me if I am off-base, is to state that your logical inferences of a=b,b=c,a=c rests upon the presupposition of a, b and c already having actual existence. This is to say, that by focusing first upon the objectivity of a,b and c you have already, in a way, isolated a,b and c from the pre-given world.
How this relates to knowledge going beyond a logical tautology is, i think, to be found in how it relates to the pre-given world- this is, i think the phenomenological argument. As an example:
Winnie the Pooh (a) is a fictional bear who belongs to Christopher Robin and wears a red shirt (b), is a tautology in that a=b. However, the question I think you might be asking is, "do we want to say that this is actual knowledge"? I think this is where I may have to step back and let others take the line of argument as my knowledge on truth theories is minimal at best. However, before I sign off I would like to add one more thing, namely, that I think the phenomenologist would state that the occurrence of this question is raised by the initial assumption that "a" has an already agreed upon objective value content rather than trying to appraise its subjective-relative nature as it exists in the pre-given or life-world.
I hope this is helpful or at least sparks discussion...how was class???
Regards,
Damian.
I can see that there is a lot of confusion here.
ReplyDeleteFirst of all, the question that I asked, five comments ago, was in need of justification, and explaination, before it could be understood as to where I am coming from, and why I would propose such a thing.
It was not asking the question "can knowledge exist as anything other than an objective statement about the phenomenal world?", but was, instead, "are we able to base our self-knowledge, purely on tautological contemplations?". This question that I posed, was full of unexplained premises, and was badly worded.
How it should have been worded, was something like "Is what I can truly call knowledge, something that is comprised purely of tautological definitions?"
The reasons why I am asking this question, is based upon certain premises (these are some of them, but not exclusively).
1) Thinking processes pre-suppose, and require, definitions, in order for them to function.
2) To engage with the thinking processes, one must be aware of these definitions.
3)Knowledge is a comparitive statement (so, a correspondence theory). I know, because my beilef that 'thing A' exists, corresponds to that of an actual existence of 'thing A'.
4A)Knowledge, as defined above, holds true for subjective and objective statements e.g. knowledge of the self is said to be knowledge, purely because it is corresponds to itself. 'I believe that thought A exists. Thought A does exist. Therefore, I have knowledge of thought A's existence')
4B)Subjective knowledge is, therefore, in essence, apodictic.
5)Knowledge is not the entirety of something, but is, rather, an aware mental engagement (thinking) with the thing in itself, in this case, the entirety of the aware mind.
This is not a satisfactory justification, I realise, but I currently do not have the time to expound on it. However, I would be happy to explain it, at another time.
There is one more thing that I would like to add, however.
In reference to my A=B=C syllogism, I would not say that any of these symbols represent objective values. They are values that are ground there existence in the mind. Yes, I agree that they must have a grounding for their existence, but it does not necessarily follow that they must be, nor are they, grounded within the objective. You seem to be necessitating that our life-world must come from the objective world; this, is something that I am not necessitating.
And also, class was gresat. You, unfortunately, missed a very invigorating speech by Xavier and Killian.
Great discussion guys. Keep it up. I'm not going to intervene at this stage but will come in at the end when the discussion has wound down. And yes all three presentations so far have been really excellent.
ReplyDeleteI'm still in the dark a little on what is being asked, but perhaps if we approach these premises one by one and see how they relate to your question things might become a little more clear for me.
ReplyDeleteBeginning with the first premise: "Thinking processes pre-suppose, and require, definitions, in order for them to function." I am not sure I wholly agree with this, as it appears that a previous assumption has been made. This is to say that, this premise is built upon the assumption that unless a linguistic or symbolic structure is already present in a mental process it can not be considered as thinking. What then is thinking, and more troubling, how do we come about acquiring the ability to think. I will try and explain a little better in an example.
Take for example an infant who is up until this point in time unable to talk- by talk I mean in a symbolic or linguistic manner. So then, up until this point every bodily function that the baby has performed, eating, crawling smiling etc., has been done so without the capability of categorising objects and sensations into a system of symbols with coherent expressible definitions. We can say, however, that the infant is capable of full range of motion and interaction with the objects in the phenomenal world. This would seem, at least to me, to indicate that it has a functioning thought process concerning its appendages in regards the surrounding objects. However, when the infant gets a little older and begins to express itself in a socially coherent linguistic manner, nothing seems to have really changed about the movements themselves. By this I mean that to put something in its mouth and chew is the same action regardless of whether or not the infant now proclaims, "I'm going to put this in my mouth and chew it".
Ok, so how does this relate to your first premise? Well, I would assert that there is a thought process occurring in both (a) the infant who can create symbolic and linguistic definitions and (b) the infant who can not create these definitions.The first premise of your assertion would seem to deny that infant (b) is capable of a thought process. The question now becomes, how does the infant come into acquiring possession of such symbols and linguistic definitions. Surely it can not be through a inherent set (This seems to adhere to a doctrine of the Platonic Forms), and conversely, surely it couldn't have learn't them because that would seem to require a thought process.
This is where, as far as I can tell, we seem to be disagreeing on your a,b,c syllogism. When I said that a,b,c had objective values I was not referring to the letters in themselves. Rather, your use of a,b,c in a demonstrative example that pertains to the phenomenal world ITSELF, implies that you have presupposed the objective value contained represented within a,b,c. So, I think Husserl is trying to point this out when he indicates that Positivism as an extension of objective science ignores the life-world as its basis for a presupposed Ontic grounding. Much in the same way that the first assertion seems to ignore the stage in the infants life where it was incapable of creating and articulating symbolic and linguistic definitions.
Again, I hope this is moving in the direction of question. If so and we can come to some agreement perhaps we can move to the second premise.
Regards,
Damian
You are quite right, Damian, in regards to the first premise. I was wrong in stating the 1st premise as it was written. I am not surprised that I wrote it, however, as I was having a lot trouble trying to lay out a clear format for the argument.
ReplyDeleteI agree with you. I do not believe that all thinking processes pre-suppose linguistics. I tried to distinguish between thinking with the awareness of what is being thought, and thinking without without expression (so, you could see one as being expressed in, and formulated into, language; while the other being thought without language, and with the inability to express what is being thought [as, I believe, you would, again, return to the realm of language]). Have a look at the comment 'J. Paul. TaylerMar 20, 2012 09:04 AM', if you need any help in understanding what I mean (Hopefully I actually spoke with a little more clarity, this time). It will be at the bottom of the comment, under dot-point **.
I also agree that it makes sense to say that an infant cannot learn without the ability to learn, already being, in-built in them; otherwise, how else could the infant come to aquire anything (even Plato's forms would require the infant/person to have the ability to discover/recognise the forms)? I do not claim to know how the cild does this.* What I think that I can be certain of, however, is that the ability to learn must be in-built into the child.
What I'm not sure of, is whether or not these thoughts that are without aware expression (the ones that are not expressed in language), exist before the aquisition (or maybe realisation) of language. Maybe, the inexpressible thought processes, are formed alongside linguistic thought. Are there any thoughts?
* Possibly, the child learns to associate utterances of certain sounds, images, written symbols, with a multitude of objects; and, from this array of general symbols representing a narrow scope of things [linguistic, or ontic], the child tries to make sense of his experiences of the formation, and the arrangements, of general symbols, when they are taken as a whole [the entire array of linguistic usage that he is exposed to]. He may then assign general symbols to the inexpressible thoughts, and see how well general symbols, in the bigger picture, cohere with one another. But, as I said, I don't claim to know.
Maybe it is even through association of objects. Like Adam's example of the hunter. He has a spear, and he kills a rabbit with it. This processes is an everyday occurence, and fulfils his need for food. He begins to associate the rabbit with food, and his spear with the ability to gain food. They become simple symbols to work with, and he may then use the spear to represent 'ability to gain food', and use it in a situation that we would deem odd, but is perfectly logical for him e.g. using his spear to gain berries.
Finally, in response to the 'a, b, c', syllogism, I did not think that you were stating that the letters were objective in themselves. I interpretted what you were possibly saying, in two ways. I read you as saying "the values that you assigned the symbols 'a', 'b', and 'c', were (either) values that assume the objective; (or) values that exist in the objective world".
ReplyDeleteAgain, I hope that I am a little bit clearer in explaining what I meant, this time round.
Do you remember our conversation today; how I said that language is a representation of experience? (I used better words, during that conversation; but I think that you understood what I meant. I think that I used the word 'epoche', although, I'm not sure if that was the right word) Well, this is exactly the way in which I was using the symbols 'a', 'b', and 'c'. I am not saying that this initial experience (this 'I', if you will) that is being represented, is drawn from any objective world, but merely that it exists, and is the initial grounding for all of one's workings.
I was using the 'a' 'b' 'c' symbols as representations of the general concept of a thought; grounded within the mind, and, potentially, grounded within a relation to ontic, or perceived as ontic, meaning (although, this objective supposition, I do not believe is necessary. I see no reason why we must suppose an objective, in order to ground our being in experience-in-itself. This, Ibelieve, can exist separately)
I hope that that made a little bit more sense.
James
Well, there certainly is a lot in those two posts worth discussing. However, rather than jumping straight into the deep end, lets do as we agreed to do earlier this afternoon. That is, lets start our philosophising from the position of the epoche illustrated and worked through by Husserl. Then from here we can both work our way forward and perhaps with some luck get closer to your question.
ReplyDeleteSo first let us begin with your question: "Is what I can truly call knowledge, something that is comprised purely of tautological definitions?" Post 21 March.
To begin with if you will agree lets use Husserl's words, "Universal doubt cancels itself. Thus, during the universal epohce, the absolutely apodictic self-evidence "I am"[the ego] is at my disposal."(pp77) Also, "Whatever else enters the stage as apodictic, as for example, mathematical axioms, certainly does leave open possibilities of doubt and thus also the conceivability of their being false."(pp78)This is the point that you stated, quite rightly, I could not deny; I will instead, with your permission, use it as our starting point. From here we have separated the "ego" from all other ontic validities- for it is the only one of which we can be certain to be true. Everything else is, as Hersserl states, "In the epoche, all these determinations, and the world itself, have been transformed into my ideae..." (pp78).
Next, let us approach knowledge in the same manner as we discussed today. You began by stating that knowledge was a comparative statement. I believe you have stated an example in one of your posts above so I won't trouble you with another. Furthermore, that before you can make this comparative statement you must have the ability to use the appropriate symbols to express said statement- in this case I believe you gave the example of language written/oral. To which then, knowledge of a cat is not knowledge of the cat in-itself, but indeed knowledge only of what is indicated or denoted by the symbol cat. I hope we are still in agreement as to the representation of how you would like to structure your argument so far.
I know this is only a small start but I am sure we can build upon it if we can discover where we are heading. If this is all ok I look forward to the continuation of the premises.
Regards,
Damian
Is this where the madman falls down and says "They understand me, at last!".
ReplyDeleteYes, this is exactly what I am talking about; or, at least, this is the very starting point for what I am talking about.
In regards to Husserl's point about mathematics being apodictic, this is where I would draw the distinction, again, between language, and the epoche. The epoche is apodictic, and cannot be denied because of what it is in itself, while mathematics, you could say the same thing about, however, with one extra addition, it exists within the linguistic realm (what implications this may have, we will discuss, later). For now, continue on.
I think that we have established the first premise.
Thank you.
Right then, for our second step forward I should like, with your permission, to follow in Husserl's logical progression from epoche into recognition of the pre-given world (life-world) as our initial grounding. It is because of our grounding in the pre-given world that we begin to raise questions of ontic validity, and so from an intentional reduction arrive at the epoche. To this we need add that, upon reflection, our experiences of the the pre-given world, before analysis- is one of subjectivity. Here Husserl directs us to the different aspects of a perceived object in the life-world, as our reason for asserting their ontic validity.
ReplyDelete"But one could and one can realise this only when one finally and quite seriously inquires into that which is taken for granted, which is presupposed by all thinking...by consistently interrogating the ontic validity meaning of these ends and accomplishments." (pp113)
I am sorry for taking the "long way around", but this is where I would like to assert the Husserl's bracketing of everything concerned with ontic validity from the "ego". This all being said, we know have a stable platform with which to view your question on knowledge.
Now we have seen that from our grounding in the pregiven-world we have performed the first intentional reduction which has led us directly to that which has its necessary existence as the consciousness performing the reflection. Further to this we have "bracketed" out any other questions of ontic validity from the "ego" and labelled them as subjective phenomena.The question we must ask ourselves now, and throughout our discussion, is "have we yet arrived at anything we can call knowledge"? We have asserted that "I exist" and in doing so indicated that we have a belief that a thing that is I exists". We have justified this belief by showing its essential necessity. The FACT that I exist, then, must be true. I would like to say that this is a kind of Objective Knowledge, although i can not say what I exist as ontically speaking. If we know turn to the description of knowledge indicated in our earlier premises we can try and see where my previous assertion lies.
This question we are now turning to is this, "Does the assertion "I exist" stand as a mere tautological definition, rather than some other form of knowledge"? There is by no means an easy way for me to answer this, and so I hope you will have patience with my explanation. Firstly, if this were a simple tautological statement it would, by your indicated definition, indicate only that the linguistic symbols "I" and "Exist" are understood. This would imply in the case of "I" an ontically laden value content. Not because the symbol "I" has anything in-itself, but rather because of our use of it. This is to say, in the alphabet the letter "I" is a symbol that pertains to the series of symbols that make up the english alphabet. However, in the use of "I exist" it points to something having an ontic validity. In much the same way we can say that 1 is a symbol that pertains to a series of numbers, but 1 "Something" indicates ontic validity of 1 "something". In addition to this I think Husserl might disagree that self-knowledge- as derived from the epoche- is a simple tautological statement. This is primarily because prior to the epoch, that is the intentional self reflection, we do not understand what the symbol "I" represents. Rather, it is only after the epoche that we can assert the "I" more clearly. Put more concisely- I hope- our understanding of the use of the symbol "I" after the epoche belongs to a continuously developing definition due to our thermatic self reflections.
ReplyDeleteI will stop here as I feel I have said enough for you to create an objection based upon your definition of knowledge. I have tried to be concise and brief in my explanation and can, and I look forward to your thoughts.
Regards,
Damian.
I agree with Damien here, it seems to me that "I exist" cannot be a tautology because that seems to imply set phenomenological definitions about the "I". A fixed definition for "I" cannot be what Husserl meant because, as far as i understand it, the statement on page 178
ReplyDelete"Not even the single philosopher by himself, within the epoche, can hold fast to anything in this elusively flowing life, repeat it with always the same content, and become so certain of its this-ness and its being-such that he could describe it, document it, so to speak (even for his own person alone), in definitive statements."
enjoying the discussion,
Xavier.
Well, as it has been quiet for some time now, I thought that I might start another discussion thread. However, so as not to lose the momentum of what we have been talking about prior to now I will try my best to inter-relate the subject matter. Before we begin I wanted to thank Paul for a fantastic presentation and the dialogue that arose from it; just brilliant!
ReplyDeleteTo begin I thought we might continue our discussion concerning truth. However, instead of focusing on "how can we know", perhaps we could turn to the question of "why should we try know". By asking this question it is not my intention to appear glib or esoteric. I would like to start our discussions here because it may allow us to see a little clearer, at the very least personally, why it should matter if knowledge is a "mere tautology" or otherwise. I am aware that the asking of this question can carry with it a subversive undercurrent or certain level sophistry, but this is not my intention.
So then to proceed I would like to return to a question I asked during class, namely, "why shouldn't we run away from conflict"? After spending some long hours thinking about this I came to three, tentative, conclusions- I welcome any argumentation on the following.
1)Run: This seems to be concerned with survival and so is a self motivated style of living. As a consequence it would appear that actions of this kind are intentionally focused on the self and intentionally disregard an "other(s)".
ReplyDelete2)Fight: This option indicates an intentionality to remove that which obscures an objective, through the use of methods and means by which the objective is not itself lost in the process. This would be a position from which actions are focused on, but not limited to, the self; this indicates scope for concerns of an "other(s)".
3)Capitulation: A recognition of the lack of intention to motivate oneself to either run or fight; a resolution to accept what is given by an "other(s)".
My question is this- if you agree with these three assertions- "what is our intention when asking questions regarding knowledge?" I would suspect that if we can answer this question first then we will be more certain of whether or not we have a "true" direction and intentionality to our observations. More importantly, if we arrive at a certain conclusion and find that we are dissatisfied with it, we will have a better understanding of why this is so.
My question to the posters is, then, "when discussing philosophical concepts why should we not run?"
Regards,
Damian
Hmm, I was just looking at a quote from Husserl that I have written up on my wall. It reads "No-one who is truly receptive to Philosophy is ever frightened off by difficulties".
ReplyDeletePhilosophy, even by it's most anyalytical members, is something that is ne'er impossible to detach one's emotions from.
Why do we do not run? We do not run because we find ourselves attached to ideals. Theories are like children; you don't merely discard them because a friend calls them 'ugly' or 'misguided'.
Philosophy is not 'the argument for argument's sake'; it argues with a purpose. And with this purpose, the goal is usually more than just mere defending a proposition; something that you may find in the legal studies (It may sound like a witty quip, but, with law, it is your job to defend, with Philosophy, you defend because the ideal, the theory, is worth fighting for; it brings one closer to wisdom).
The telos of Philosophical argument is one that stays true to its name; the love of wisdom.
You stay to fight, because you see a purpose that goes beyond mere argument. It doesn't matter if you are correct in any objective sense; it is something close to your heart.
Make no mistake, I didn't answer your proposition in syllogistic format for a reason. It is not an analytical question, but one that finds its understanding in the experience, and not in mere words.
So, why do we not run? Because we cannot. There was never any real threat.
Thank you for your post James, I liked the literary touch- ne'er. What you have presented is certainly an interesting point of view! As we discussed I put together an observational paper for your inspection and would be glad to hear of how you feel your comments correspond with or reject my observations.
ReplyDeletehttp://dl.dropbox.com/u/74136378/Run.docx
Regards,
Damian